Abstract. Veriable electronic voting has been extensively researched for over twenty years, but few protocols have achieved real-life deployment. A key impediment, we argue, is caused by the existing protocols' universal reliance on the probity of the tallying authorities. This might seem surprising to many people as dependence on tallying authorities has been a de facto standard in the eld. However, this dependence is actually a legacy inherited from traditional physical voting, one that has proved problematic in the electronic context. In this paper, we propose a radically new concept called self-enforcing electronic voting, which refers to voting systems that are free from reliance on any tallying authority.
Proposal
Our proposal is to eliminate the reliance on (allegdly) trustworthy tallying authorities altogether. We call the resultant voting system self-enforcing electronic voting . Figure 1 portrays the evolution of voting technologies. From the beginning of voting, central authority has been playing a pivotal role in instilling trust in the tallying process (an issue which is neatly captured by a famous saying attributed to Joseph Stalin: It's not the people who vote that count; it's the people who count the votes). In the current e-voting deployment around the world (US, India, Brazil, etc.), voters have to trust their e-voting machine completely, and transitively have to trust the authority that certies the machine. Researchers have been trying to apply cryptography to make these e-voting systems more veriable. The current state of the art in the eld involves distributing trust among several authorities using some cryptographic threshold scheme. This is an improvement over relying on a single authority, but not a clean solution. Voters have to trust the authorities do not collude but they cannot verify that this is indeed the case. The mere fear that the authorities might collude to compromise the election would have deterred many voters in the rst place. Against this background, our vision of next generation e-voting is that the election will need to be self-enforcing: free from reliance on any tallying authorities.
We now give a slightly more formal denition of self-enforcing e-voting. For simplicity of explanation, we discuss just the case of a single-candidate election.
However, the denition can be easily generalized to multi-candidate elections.
Consider a machine that pre-computes a table of N electronic ballots before the election. As shown in Table 1 , each ballot contains two cryptograms representing: No and Yes (which correspond to numeric values 0 and 1 respectively in our implementation). We thereby dene a (single-candidate) self-enforcing evoting system as one that satises the following properties.
1. Well-formedness For each ballot, given n i or y i , it is easy for anyone to verify that the given cryptogram is an encryption of one of the two values:
No and Yes. In this section, we show the proposed system is feasible by addressing the following three questions: 1) is it possible? 2) how does it work? 3) is it practical?
The rst question is whether self-enforcing e-voting is theoretically possible.
We answer this question armatively. In particular, the DRE-i protocol (Hao, Kreeger, 2011) as described in [2] fulls all of the above properties. However, the DRE-i protocol is only one specic embodiment; there may be other methods to realize "self-enforcing e-voting". Hence, in this paper, we will only discuss the abstraction of system, focusing on the essence of the new proposal.
The second question is how does such a system work in practice. Given a cryptosystem that satises the four properties, it is straightforward to apply it to e-voting. As an example, let us consider an on-site voting system that employs a touch-screen Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machine to records votes. Before the election, the machine generates a table of N ballots as shown in Table 1 (N should be signicantly bigger than the total number of eligible voters).
During the election, each authenticated voter casts her vote in two stages.
First, the DRE machine displays an unused ballot with both cryptograms initially hidden. The voter touches one choice from the screen -say she chooses
No. The DRE machine reveals the value of the No_Cryptogram on the screen.
In stage two, the voter should either conrm or cancel the vote. If she chooses conrm, the ballot is casted. If she selects cancel, she essentially performs the auditing function. The machine must in this case reveal the other cryptogram.
With both cryptograms revealed, the ballot is counted as a dummy vote. Dummy votes will not add to the tally. The voter will be assigned another unused ballot and repeat the same two-stage process to vote.
In the above procedure, all the revealed cryptograms (including valid as well as dummy votes) will be published on a public bulletin board and also printed on the receipt. Based on the Well-formedness Property, anyone can verify that the conrmed vote is either No or Yes. Based on the Concealing Property, the single revealed cryptogram does not disclose the voter's choice, so the receipt does not show how the voter had voted (this is to prevent coercion). However, the same Concealing Property also implies that the DRE machine might cheat when one selects "No", the machine may display Yes_Cryptogram, and the voter would not be able to tell the dierence (i.e., knowing that his vote had been subverted). This is where the Revealing Property becomes useful. If the machine cheats by switching the cryptograms, this will be caught when the voter chooses to cancel (i.e., audit) the vote. Finally, the Self-tallying Property ensures that when the election nishes, any member of the public is able to tally the Yes votes without involving any tallying authorities. (Satisfying the Self-tallying Property is the most dicult part in the design of a self-enforcing voting system. The way that is achieved in [2] is based on a technique proposed six years ago at SPW'06 [3] .)
The third question perhaps the most important and most dicult is whether the proposed system is practical. We answer this question positively by presenting two real-world trial elections based on the self-enforcing e-voting technology, as we detail in the following section. In both cases, participants were able to try the items on oer and then take a random paper slip from a box placed next to the food. The food and the paper slips were put in a room that was only accessible to the department sta and PhD students. The slip contained a web address for on-line voting and a random passcode. Each participant was free to take a random passcode, so voting was anonymous. When participants had nished voting on-line, they were asked to complete a questionnaire.
Chocolate Election
This trial was based on an implementation of the DRE-i protocol using a multiplicative cyclic group the same underlying group as the Digital Signing Algorithm (DSA). The voting trial had 39 participants. All participants casted a conrmed vote. Four of them audited a ballot once (i.e., casted a dummy vote) before conrming their votes. No voter audited more than once.
The feedback questionnaire consisted of 6 statements and respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (i.e., strongly agree, agree, neural, disagree, strongly disagree). The statements were as follows:
1. I understood how to vote.
2. Voting was easy.
3. I understood how to check my ballot had been recorded correctly.
4. Checking that my ballot had been correctly recorded was easy.
5. I understood why I was being asked to check ballots.
6. I felt condent that my vote had been recorded correctly.
The feedback questionaire was answered by 23 voters. One respondent did not give an answer for statement 2; other than this, every respondent gave an answer for every statement. The results are shown in Table 2 4.2 Cheese Election
The subsequent cheese election trial was conducted one month after the chocolate election. For this trial, we changed the implementation to using an additive cyclic group the same underlying group as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signing Algorithm (ECDSA). The basic DRE-i protocol remained the same, but the implementation became more ecient and the size of the receipt signicantly shorter.
The voting trial had 35 participants. All participants casted a conrmed vote, and one voter audited a ballot once before conrming the nal vote. No voter audited more than once. 
(Agree)
The feedback questionaire consisted of 7 statements and respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement on the same Likert scale as before. The statements were as follows:
Voting was easy.
3. I understood how to check my ballot had been recorded correctly 4. Checking that my ballot had been correctly recorded was easy.
I felt condent that my vote was anonymous.
The questionaire was answered by 20 voters. Every respondent gave an answer to every statement. 
User feedbacks and open issues
In the trials, we did not provide any manual to explain how to vote. The only thing that was available to the voter is a slip that contains a voting website URL and a random password. We wanted to see how far voters could go. The feedback shows that users generally found the system intuitive to use overall 86% of users stated that they well understood how to vote even without any manual or prior training; 71% rated the voting procedure as "easy"/"very easy"; 58% expressed their "condence"/"strong condence" that their votes had been recorded correctly. Clearly, there is still a lot of room for improvement, but we found the initial user feedbacks broadly encouraging.
So far our pioneering investigation on self-enforcing e-voting has increased our belief that it has great potential. However, we have also identied a number of open issues. (In fact, most of these issues are generally applicable to all evoting protocols, not specically to ours.)
1. Zero Knowledge Proofs The Well-formedness Property requires using the ZKPs to ensure the correct format of the ciphertext. Existing ZKPs techniques can well support the rst-past-the-post type of voting (using the 1-of-n ZKP), but not the ranked choice voting. More research in this aspect is much needed.
2. Receipts Voters need to verify the receipt against the public bulletin board to ensure the data match. However, the cryptographic data printed on the receipt is essentially random. Comparing random data is trivial to a computer, but tedious to a human. In our rst trial, about 43% users expressed diculties in comparing receipts against the data on public bulletin board.
In the subsequent trial, we improved the implementation using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography to make the receipt signicantly shorter. But still 40% users found it dicult to visually compare the receipt with the bulletin board.
This highlights a serious usability problem that has been generally ignored in the past. An often-suggested solution is to apply some visual hashing technique to transform the random data to a visual pattern. However, we have not found a really good visual hashing algorithm that is suitable for practical use. An alternative solution, as we propose, is to print the receipt on a transparency, that the user can overlay on the computer screen to verify that the data match identically.
3. Re-voting Re-voting permits a voter to vote multiple times but ensures that only the last vote counts. Although it appears to be a useful feature, re-voting should be implemented with caution. This is because re-voting essentially overwrites the previous vote, and thus invalidates the previous receipt. Disputes may arise if the re-voting requests are not handled in a publicly evident manner. We know it is possible to implement re-voting at a polling station (as explained in [2] ), but currently we do not know how to do it securely in an entirely remote setting. (We notice that Helios allows re-voting in an Internet election [1] , but we have not seen detailed analysis on how this was securely achieved.)
4. Anonymity In our implementation, anonymity is achieved through physical means: each voter takes a random password to vote. Of course, this solution will not work in an entirely remote setting. The Helios system claims to protect user's anonymity over the Internet by using pseudonyms [1] . But we think that claim is incorrect the server can still work out the matching between the real user and the pseudonym. The problem of how to achieve real anonymity in remote e-voting without any physical means is still unsolved. In fact, we do not even know if the problem is solvable.
5. Auditing If we allow voters to audit the system (i.e., voter-initiated auditing), how many of them would actually endeavor to do that? This is an important question, but has been generally neglected in the past. For example, we did not nd concrete data in the Helios paper [1] . Our own trials indicated that without any incentive scheme only a very small percentage of our voters had bothered to audit the system: only 7%. (And these were all computer scientists, many of whom were particularly interested in security and dependability.) This shows the necessity of employing dedicated auditors (possibly from the representatives of dierent parties) for national-scale elections. But still, we consider it important to set up incentive schemes to encourage voters to audit the system. One specic example of the scheme is suggested here as follows: if the voter chooses to audit the system, he will get a charity token, and he will be free to donate it to one of the charities near the exit of the polling station. We regard this simple solution as an especially ethical form of so-called ethical bribery we term it the Waitrose scheme to acknowledge a similar charity program run by Waitrose food stores in the UK.
6. Understandability How does one get the general public to trust a system that they know they do not understand, especially one whose use/reliance on cryptography is all too invisible and mysterious to them? We do not yet have a good answer to that, but the same question applies to all e-voting schemes that involve cryptography.
7. Dependability In conventional e-voting schemes, tallying authorities have some error-correction capability: if some ballots are lost, the authorities may decide to exclude the missing ballots and only tally the rest (of course, this capability may be misused). By contrast, self-enforcing e-voting schemes are free from tallying authorities (and hence free from any potential misuse), but they naturally lose the external error-correction capability. As a result, all electronic data on the public bulletin board must be precise and complete; otherwise, the public verication of the integrity of the tally will fail. In the extreme disastrous situation where electronic data on the bulletin board is corrupted, the system will degenerate to the current e-voting products,
where the e-voting machine announces a tally at the end of election, but the public are unable to verify it. In summary, self-enforcing e-voting has bought its property of self-tallying at a cost of much higher dependability requirements. We believe this is achievable, but further research is needed.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined a new design called self-enforcing electronic voting. This addresses a critical problem in e-voting: ensuring the integrity of the election tallying result when the e-voting machine is totally corrupted. And this goal is achieved without any tallying authority involvement, which greatly simplies the election management and organisation.
Our proposal is only the rst step in exploring a new direction in e-voting and there are still a number of open issues to resolve, but we believe it has promising potential of becoming the next-generation e-voting.
